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Abstract
Growth is endogenous in small open economies with substantial hidden
or open unemployment, even under constant returns to scale. Growth
promoting policies, however, have implications for the balance of trade,
and two instruments are needed in order to achieve targets for both the
growth rate and the balance of trade. The real exchange rate can serve as
one of those instruments. Distributional conict imposes constraints on
real exchange rate policies, but in LDCs the main exchange-rate related
distributional conict may be over the sectoral distribution of prots,
rather than the real wage. This paper develops a model along these lines
and presents empirical support for the hypothesis that real exchange rate
undervaluations are a useful instrument for the pursuit of accumulation
and growth in low income countries.
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1 Introduction
Growth is endogenous in a dual economy without full employment, as evidenced
for instance by the classic Harrod-Domar and Lewis models. This endogeneity
of the growth rate also applies to open economies. In open economies, however,
one needs to consider the implications of growth promoting policies for the
balance of trade. Our basic argument is simple: two instruments are needed in
order to achieve two targets (a growth rate and a balance of trade target). The
real exchange rate can serve as one of those instruments.
Most of contemporary economics assumes full employment, and those mod-
els that do include unemployment tend to play down the balance of payments
constraint and the role of the real exchange rate in this regard. We disagree with
both of these positions. Many developing economies have signicant amounts
of (hidden) unemployment, and a recent empirical literature suggests that the
real exchange rate may have an important inuence on long term economic per-
formance. The precise mechanisms behind this inuence, however, are unclear,
and it is one of the aims of this paper to help ll that gap.1
We set up a stylized model of a small open economy. The economy has
two sectors, both with constant returns to scale. A modern sector produces a
tradable good while the output of a traditional sector is non-tradable. Only
the former uses capital and all capital goods are imported. Assuming unem-
ployment, we show that changes in the real exchange rate a¤ect the quantity
and composition of employment and that the real exchange rate can be used
to facilitate sustained capital accumulation. Real exchange rate policies of this
kind have distributional e¤ects but in low income countries, we argue, the main
exchange-rate related distributional conict may be over the sectoral distribu-
tion of prots.
Our empirical section focuses on the role of real exchange rate undervalu-
ations in promoting investment and output growth. We begin by replicating
the results reported by Rodrik (2008). We nd that Rodriks conclusion per-
taining to di¤erences between developing and developed countries in the growth
e¤ect of real exchange rate misalignments is sensitive to how these groups are
dened in terms of income levels. We then create alternative classications
and nd that, in general, real exchange rate misalignments do appear to have
a more signicant e¤ect on growth for developing countries. Our main empiri-
cal contribution, however, is to analyze the relationship between real exchange
rate changes and investment in light of our theoretical framework. We show
that real exchange rate undervaluations are (statistically) signicant drivers of
investment growth, but only in developing countries. This result is robust to
di¤erent specications, controls, and econometric methods.
The paper falls in eight sections. Section 2 surveys relevant literature while
Section 3 provides some more context with the help of Chinese historical data.
The benchmark model is presented in Section 4. We analyze the long-run
implications of the model in Section 5 and consider the short run in Section
1According to Eichengreen (2007) the literature has invested more in documenting the
growth rate-real exchange rate correlation than in identifying channels of inuence.
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6. Section 7 discusses the econometrics and presents the results. Section 8
concludes.
2 Literature Review
Macroeconomic analysis has traditionally played down the role of the exchange
rate in causing or sustaining growth, although this may have recently begun to
change. The real exchange rate has been seen as an endogenous variable, its
value being determined in a general equilibrium set-up by deeperparameters
such as preferences, factor endowments, and productivity, along with the level
of income of a country (the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect). In the canonical (small
country) dependent economy framework, for example, the domestic price of
tradables in domestic currency terms is determined internationally while the
price of non-tradables is determined by the deeper parameters. Development
economists, on their part, may reject assumptions of purchasing power parity
and full employment but, with important exceptions, have tended in the past to
ignore the potential role of the real exchange rate in development policy, perhaps
due to the traditional view of developing countries as exporters of primary
commodities and the resulting elasticity pessimism.
The perceived irrelevance of policy in inuencing exchange rates is now be-
ing challenged. A body of literature shows that the real exchange rate tracks
the nominal exchange rate quite closely over time which suggests that targeting
the latter may e¤ectively target the former as well, at least in the short- and
medium-run. Moreover, the ability of policy to inuence the exchange rate in
the presence of capital mobility may have been underestimated. As illustrated
by the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, even assets from countries with completely
open capital accounts appear not to be perfect substitutes (and capital con-
trols seem to inuence the nature if not magnitudes of capital ows). The
capital-account-openness vertex of the impossible trilemma is, therefore, less
binding than would be the case in a world with unrestricted capital mobility
and negligible country risk premia. While the e¤ect of sterilized interventions
in developed countries is debatable, such interventions in developing countries
do seem to have an impact, perhaps because international risk premia are higher
for developing country assets, and/or because foreign exchange markets tend to
be less deep in such countries.2 Thus, governments have a variety of policy
options including monetary and scal policy, saving incentives, capital controls,
and reserve management, and the evidence suggests that governments do indeed
use several tools at their disposal to target exchange rates.
Such policies can be e¤ective. Recent empirical studies of the role of compet-
itive exchange rates in promoting development have found a robust correlation
between competitive exchange rates and economic growth.3 An interesting ex-
2See, for example Frenkel and Rapetti (2008) for a discussion of the Argentinean experience
of exchange rate management with sterilized interventions.
3See Razin and Collins (1997), Levi-Yeyati and Sturzeneggar (2007), Rodrik (2008), and
the literature cited below. A few recent studies have found a similar relationship between
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ample is the study by Hausmann et al. (2005) which identied and analyzed
determinants of growth episodes in the latter half of the twentieth century.
In other studies, Polterovich and Popov (2002) empirically identify exports as
one of the channels through which competitive exchange rates correlate with
productivity and long term growth while Berg et al. (2008) nd that episodes
of growth in developing countries tend to be sustained and prolonged by com-
petitive exchange rates and export diversication.
Rodrik (2008) nds that (i) an undervaluation has a positive impact on the
size (and share) of output of the tradable sector in general and the industrial
sector in particular, and (ii) the e¤ects of exchange rate changes on growth acts
through the related change in the size of the tradable sector. Generally one
would expect an expansion of the tradable sector to be accompanied by greater
employment in that sector and, indeed, Galindo et al. (2001) and Frenkel and
Ros (2006) nd that real exchange rate depreciations boost industrial employ-
ment in samples of Latin American countries. Prasad et al. (2007a) reach the
near mirror image conclusion that foreign capital inows (roughly the ip side of
current account surpluses) tend to be associated with exchange rate overvalua-
tion, which in turn has a detrimental e¤ect on sectoral allocation, manufactured
exports and growth (a form of the Dutch diseasephenomenon).
This emerging body of empirical evidence - along with East Asias rapid
accumulation of reserves in the pursuit of what is widely seen as export-led
growth - has stimulated interest in the theoretical linkages between the real
exchange rate and growth. A common justication for undervalued real ex-
change rates is the need to shift resources toward the tradable sector, but in
a traditional framework with full employment this begs the question of what
makes the tradable sector special. Rodrik (2008) provides an answer in terms
of market failures and endogenous growth. Production in the tradable sector,
he argues, is especially a­ icted by institutional weaknesses and market failures
(information and coordination externalities), and this leads to a bias against
this sector in the allocation of resources. Exchange rate undervaluation boosts
prots in the tradable sector and the resulting sectoral reallocation raises the
growth rate in an AK-type model of endogenous growth.
While Rodriks model focuses on sectoral di¤erences in the degree of insti-
tutional weakness, development economics has traditionally stressed both the
level e¤ects of moving labor from low productivity sectors to the modern in-
dustrial sector and dynamic e¤ects associated with greater scope for learning
by doing (or other growth enhancing externalities) in the tradable sector. Even
if the magnitude of the externalities and scale e¤ects in the tradable sector is
insu¢ cient to allow for permanent endogenous growth, the scale e¤ects may
generate multiple equilibria, and temporary exchange rate shocks can send the
economy to a new long run equilibrium (Krugman, 1987; Ros and Skott, 1998).
Some form of increasing returns, broadly interpreted, underpins these expla-
nations. An alternative macroeconomic justication for undervalued exchange
real exchange rates and growth take-o¤ s on the one hand and real exchange rates and the
duration of growth episodes on the other. See, for example, Hausmann et al. (2005) and Berg
et al. (2008).
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rates is provided by Kaleckian models with underutilized resources. In this set-
ting, a depreciation may boost aggregate demand (via the trade balance) and
output in the short-run, and in a prot-led regime a real depreciation also stim-
ulates growth due to the ensuing redistribution of income towards capitalists.4
Sectoral dimensions, however, tend to get ignored in the Kaleckian tradi-
tion, and developing economies typically have dual labor markets with the trad-
able goods being produced mainly in modern/urban/formal sectors and the
non-tradables in traditional/rural/informal sectors.5 Policies that benet the
tradable sector have consequences for the distribution between wages, prots,
and land rents, as well as for distribution between workers in the two sectors.
Most Kaleckian models pay little attention to these aspects, and the Kaleck-
ian tradition, moreover, tends to emphasize quantity adjustments to external
disequilibria over external relative price adjustments.
The balance of payments-constrained growth model (BPCG), due origi-
nally to Thirlwall (1979), shares the latter property. The BPCG model postu-
lates that, given constraints on external balances, the growth of external demand
determines the rate at which internal demand can grow, which in turn constrains
output growth. To the extent that real exchange rate depreciations relax the
external constraint, a depreciation would promote growth in this framework. A
lasting e¤ect on growth, however, requires a process of continuously depreciat-
ing exchange rates, and this literature typically treats the real exchange rate as
an exogenously given constant.
Our long-run model in this paper takes tradable goodsprices to be deter-
mined internationally but, unlike the standard dependent economy model,we
assume that there is substantial hidden or open unemployment, that the mo-
bilization of these underemployed resources is at the core of the development
problem, and that the real exchange rate a¤ects growth via its impact on in-
vestment, saving, distribution, and the trade balance. Unlike most Keynesian
inspired models, we use a two sector framework with tradable and non-tradable
goods. Unlike Kaleckian open economy models, we assume that trade is bal-
anced and that the rate of capital utilization is una¤ected by exchange rate
policy in the long run.6 Unlike the BPCG tradition, our focus is on the real
exchange rate and we assume that the demand for exports is perfectly elastic.
An interesting feature of the existing literature is that in studies with both
developing and industrialized countries, the undervaluation-growth nexus ap-
pears to hold for developing countries but not developed countries.7 This result
4See, for example, Blecker (2002). To the extent that they come at the expense of other
countries, these e¤ects in Kaleckian models have a beggar-thy-neighbor avor. See Blecker
and Razmi (2008) for an investigation of the fallacy of compositionargument.
5Agricultural goods produced in rural areas are potentially tradable goods but the non-
standardized nature of these products, the fact that a large proportion of food is grown
for (extended) household consumption, and the widespread presence of tari¤s, taxes, and
quantitative, non-tari¤ barriers in agriculture renders a substantial portion of this sectors
output non-tradable.
6Accommodating variations in the rate of capital utilization are central to the Kaleckian
approach, but this mechanism becomes questionable beyond the short run (Skott, 2008).
7Examples are Prasad et al. (2007a), Rodrik (2008), and Polterovich and Popov (2002).
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is consistent with the theoretical argument and the empirical results in this
paper (but also with Rodriks 2008 argument, since the market failures and
distortions are likely to be more prevalent in developing countries).
3 China: Some illustrative statistics
This section illustrates the motivation underpinning our theoretical model and
empirical analysis by briey focusing on a major developing country, China. As
is well-known, the Chinese economy has sustained record growth rates over the
last three decades. The process has involved moving millions of workers from
the rural hinterland to the industrialized urban areas (mainly to the coastal
provinces in the south and south east). Goods produced in the rural areas
tend to be relatively non-traded in nature in many low-income countries, partly
due to lack of modern infrastructure that makes it harder to satisfy the quality
standards demanded by international markets. This is particularly true for
the agricultural sector where health and other non-tari¤ barriers remain high.
Figure 1 illustrates this in the Chinese context. The measure of tradability
was developed from the input-output tables from National Bureau of Statistics
(2008, Table 3-24) by subtracting one from the ratio of the total domestic usage
for each sector to the total domestic output of that product.8 We interpret the
absolute magnitude as a proxy for the tradability of a sectors output and the
sign as an indication of whether it is import-intensive (positive sign) or export-
intensive (negative sign). Mining appears to be the most import-intensive sec-
tor while textile, apparel, and footwear appears to be the most export-intensive.
Other manufacturingalso appears to fall in the highly export-intensive cate-
gory. Notice that the index for agriculture is close to zero. Not surprisingly,
construction, the supply of electricity, and real estate also appear to have a very
low traded component.
Figure 2 shows time plots of our (Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect-adjusted) mea-
sure of real exchange rate undervaluation, GDP growth, and capital accumula-
tion (see Section 7 for details of how the measure of undervaluation was con-
structed). Data for accumulation were derived from Wang and Szirmai (2008).
The numbers are 5 year averages for the period 1950-2004. The Chinese real ex-
change rate, according to our measure, was overvalued (less than zero in value)
up until the early 1980s and has been undervalued since then. The turning
point neatly coincides with the market reforms of the early eighties that trans-
formed China into a much more open economy. The co-movement between the
degree of undervaluation on the one hand, and output growth and accumula-
tion on the other is quite clear. In particular, output growth and accumulation
pick up noticeably once the measure of undervaluation turns positive in the
early 1980s. Figure 3 presents a scatter plot to more directly illustrate the re-
lationship between undervaluation and investment growth. Finally, Figure 4
8 In other words, for sector i, TIi = (Ci+ Ii+Gi+Mi Xi)=(Ci+ Ii+Gi+Xi Mi)  1,
where TI = tradability index, C = consumption, I = investment (excluding inventories), G
= government expenditures, X = exports, and M = imports.
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suggests a very strong positive association between the degree of undervaluation
and the trade balance (a surplus being positive). While disaggregated data are
not available from UN COMTRADE for earlier years, data since 1995 show that
China managed to grow at a rapid clip while avoiding large decits and even
while it experienced negative net exports of capital goods through most of this
period.9
While this section has provided some context for the theoretical exercise in
the next section, we formally explore some of these correlations in Section 7.
4 A Long-Run Model
The benchmark model is deliberately kept simple. It captures, we believe, im-
portant features of most low income countries, and many of the assumptions can
be relaxed without a¤ecting the qualitative conclusions (see appendix A). This
section describes a long run equilibrium; short run modications are introduced
in section 6.
We consider a small open economy with a non-tradable and a tradable goods
sector. Investment goods are imported while the domestically produced tradable
good can be used for domestic consumption or export. The non-tradable good
is produced using labor (and a xed supply of land),
YN = AL

N ; 0 <   1 (1)
where YN ; LN denote output and employment in the non-tradable sector. Under
prot maximization and perfect competition, the income share of labor would
be constant and equal to . We shall retain the assumption of constant dis-
tributive shares in the non-tradable sector but take the share of wages to equal
v. Deviations from marginal productivity pricing could occur for a number
of reasons, including monopsonistic e¤ects (which would imply  < 1) and the
inuence of social norms and conventions (with  ? 1). We do not make any
specic assumption about the value of  but restrict the product  (the share
of labor) to be strictly less than one.10
Empirical measures of the real wage in a traditional, non-tradable sector may
be hard to interpret in the presence of hidden unemployment and underemploy-
ment. Our distributional assumptions imply that the wage share is uniquely
determined, but the e¤ective labor input LN may be spread across a larger
number of workers and/or involve a larger amount of low intensity work. We
therefore consider two distinct measures of the real wage in the traditional sec-
tor. One of them, the e¤ective wage!N , is found by dividing the well-dened
9The authorscalculations from UN COMTRADE data show that between 1995 and 2008,
China ran a decit in industrial supplies and capital goods (BEC categories 2 and 4) and a
surplus in consumer goods (BEC category 6) throughout almost the entire period. Data are
not available for earlier years.
10The condition  < 1 is needed to ensure the existence of an equilibrium solution when
workers in the traditional sector spend their entire income on non-traded goods. Once we
relax this latter assumption (see the appendix), this condition is no longer needed.
6
total wage payment by the e¤ective labor input LN :
!N =
wN
pN
= AL 1N ; 0 <   1;  < 1 (2)
An alternative measure assumes that the traditional sector is characterized by
work sharing. If unemployment takes the form of underemployment, the empir-
ically measured wage in the traditional sector may be the average remuneration,
that is, total labor income divided by the number of workers not employed in
the formal sector. This sharing wage(~!N ) is given by
~!N =
!NLN
L  LT  !N (3)
where LT is employment in the tradable sector. Depending on institutional
characteristics, the measured wage in the traditional, non-tradable sector may
fall anywhere between the sharing wage ~!N and the e¤ective wage !N :
Tradable goods are produced in the formal (advanced, capitalist) sector.
This sector uses both labor and capital, and for simplicity a xed coe¢ cient
production function is assumed, i.e.
YT = minfaLT ;bKg (4)
where YT ; LT and K denote output, employment and capital in the tradable
goods sector. The parameters a and b are taken to be xed, and we assume
that there is no labor hoarding and that capital utilization is at the desired rate
u. Hence,
YT = aLT = ubK = bK (5)
where u is desired utilization and b = ub. The utilization assumption will be
modied in section 6 when we address short-run issues.
Labor is mobile across sectors. However, workers in the tradable sector
may receive a wage premium, and we take the tradable-sector real wage to be
determined by the tradable-sector employment rate LT =L, the relative price of
tradables q, and the saving rate s,
!T =
wT
pN
= 

LT
L
; q; s

; 1  0; 2  0; 3  0 (6)
A wage premium may exist for a variety of reasons, including principal-agent
problems (e¢ ciency wages) and bargaining in the presence of costly search and
relationship-specic investment. The value of sharing wage ~!N along with the
tradable-sector employment rate LT =L are key determinants of workers fall-
back position in both e¢ ciency wage and bargaining models, and the general
specication in equation (6) is consistent with tradable-sector wages being de-
termined as a markup on the sharing wage, with the markup as a function of
employment and the exchange rate: !T = (LTL ; q)~!N (see note 12 below).
The real exchange rate enters the  function both because it determines the
total revenue (the size of the pie) in the tradable sector and may a¤ect the
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size of the wage premium  and because of its inuence on the demand for
non-tradables, non-tradable employment and the sharing wage; the saving rate
enters the  function because it a¤ects the demand for non-tradables and the
sharing wage.
By denition, the equilibrium condition for non-tradables is given by
YN = EN (7)
where EN is the domestic demand for the non-tradables. We assume that the
non-tradables are used only for consumption. Workers do not save and consume
only non-tradables.11 Non-workers (capitalists and landlords), on the other
hand, save a fraction s of their income and consume both non-tradables and
tradables. Thus, the demand for non-tradables can be written
EN = !NLN + !TLT + (1  s)[qbK   !TLT + (1  )ALN ] (8)
where  is the proportion of capitalist and landlord consumption that is spent
on the non-tradable. These assumptions about the demand for non-tradables t,
we believe, the stylized facts for LDCs; the appendix examines the implications
of allowing worker saving and worker consumption of tradables.
The proportion  depends on q; and if tradable and non-tradables are gross
substitutes (the likely case), the dependence is positive
 = (q); 0 > 0 (9)
The tradable good can be exported or consumed domestically. We take world
demand to be perfectly elastic at a given price in foreign currency, pT ; and with
a given supply of tradables, the equilibrium condition for the tradable goods
sector serves to determine the trade balance net of investment (or, equivalently,
the net exports of the tradable good),
XT = YT   ET (10)
Clearly, it can be di¢ cult to break into new export markets, and the innite-
elasticity assumption will be modied in the short run analysis (see section 6).
11Data for a number of developing countries from LABORSTA (2009) suggest that the pro-
portion of household expenditures devoted to food and housing decreases, while that devoted
to clothing and other manufactures increases as we move up the income distribution. For
Macau, China in 2002-03, for example, expenditures on food and housing decline from 69.6%
to 27.4% while expenditure on clothing, footwear, and other manufactures rises from 8.4%to
17.8% as we move from the lowest to the highest decile of expenditure distribution.
The saving propensity out of wages is small in most developing economies. Even for high
saving countries like China, the bulk of the saving comes from prot and rent income. One
indirect piece of evidence in this regard comes from the oft-cited empirical regularity that
the wage share of national income in developing countries tends to be positively correlated
with the consumption share. World Bank (2007, p. 6) illustrates the co-movement of these
variables in China in recent years, and Kuijs (2006) nds that while Chinese household saving
out of disposable income (which includes some interest, rent and prot income) is high, what
makes the saving to GDP ratio exceptional is the presence of high enterprise and government
savings.
We relax these assumptions in the appendix.
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The domestic consumption demand for the tradable good is given by
ET = (1  )(1  s)[qbK   !TLT + (1  )ALN ]=q (11)
and the relative price of tradables, which is our long-run measure of the real
exchange rate, can be written
q =
epT
pN
(12)
where e is the nominal exchange rate (i.e., the domestic currency price of foreign
currency). All capital goods are imported at a world market price pK in foreign
currency. Thus, the trade balance (in terms of non-tradables) can be written
TB = q

XT   pK
pT
I

= q

YT   ET   pK
pT
I

(13)
Trade need not be balanced in the short run but sustainability requirements
constrain the value of the trade balance (relative to the size of the economy) in
the long run. For simplicity, we assume that in the long run
TB = 0 (14)
The accumulation rate in the tradable goods sector depends on its protabil-
ity relative to the international prot rate and the cost of investment. Formally,
I
K
= f(r   r; ) = f
 
b
pT
pK
 
1  
 
LT
L ; q; s

aq
!
  r; 
!
; fr > 0; f > 0
(15)
where r is the international prot rate and  can be interpreted as a policy
variable that a¤ects the incentive to invest. We take this policy variable to be
an inverse measure of the cost of nance/the interest rate, rather than, say,
a government subsidy to investment which would need to be nanced, adding
variables to the model. Finally, real aggregate income and aggregate domestic
demand, both in terms of non-tradables, are given by
Y = YN + qYT (16)
E = EN + qET + q
pK
pT
I (17)
5 The real exchange rate and economic growth
5.1 Analysis
Tradable-sector employment is determined by the capital stock,
LT =
b
a
K (18)
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and, substituting (18) into (6), the tradable-sector wage can be written
!T = 

b
a
K
L
; q; s

(19)
The solutions for non-tradable output, employment and wages are more in-
volved. Using equations (2) and (5)-(8), the equilibrium value of non-tradable
output is
YN =
"
(1  s)q
(1  (1  s)) +
( ba
K
L ; q; s)
a
#
bK
(1  ) (20)
and the solutions for e¤ective non-tradable employment and wages are given
by12
LN =
("
(1  s)q
(1  (1  s)) +
( ba
K
L ; q; s)
a
#
bK
A(1  )
)1=
(21)
!N = A
("
(1  s)q
(1  (1  s)) +
( ba
K
L ; q; s)
a
#
bK
A(1  )
)( 1)=
(22)
~!N =
1
L  LT 
"
(1  s)q
(1  (1  s)) +
( ba
K
L ; q; s)
a
#
bK
(1  ) (23)
Both tradable and non-tradable employment are increasing inK (equations (18)
and (21)) as are wages in the tradable sector (equation (19)). The average non-
tradable remuneration also depends positively on K (equation (23)) but the
e¤ective real wage in the non-tradable sector is una¤ected if  = 1 or declines
if  < 1 (equation (22)). Non-tradable output, employment, average wage
remuneration, and tradable-sector wages are increasing in q and decreasing in s;
e¤ective wages in the non-tradable sector are decreasing in q and increasing in
s (if  < 1). The positive e¤ect of q on non-tradable output and employment 
which is due both to income and substitution e¤ects ows from the existence of
unemployment. In a standard full employment model, a rise in the relative price
of a good would shift resources away from the sector whose relative price has
declined; with unemployment and a perfectly elastic export demand, however,
the change in relative prices generates an increase in non-tradable demand, and
a rise in employment makes it possible to meet this extra demand.
12 In the special case where !T = (
LT
L
; q)~!N , the expression for ~wN can be written
~!N =
a(1  s)q
[1  (1  s)][(1  LT
L
)(1  )  LT
L
]
LT
L
The right hand side of this equation is increasing in the formal-sector employment rate LT =L
and the real exchange rate q and decreasing in the saving rate s. It follows that !T =


LT
L
; q

~!N is a special case of the general specication in equation (6), !T = 

LT
L
; q; s

.
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Turning now to the trade balance, eqs. (5)-(6), (11), (13)-(15) and (21)
imply that
0 =
TB
q pKpT K
=
b
pK
pT
s
1  (1  s)  
I
K
(24)
=
b
pK
pT
s
1  (1  s)   f
 
b
pT
pK
 
1  (
b
a
K
L ; q; s)
aq
!
  r; 
!
= F

q; ;
K
L

; Fq ? 0; F < 0; FK  0 (25)
The partials F and FK are straightforward. By assumption an increase in  (a
decrease in the cost of nance) stimulates investment, thus reducing the trade
balance; an increase in the capital stock relative to the total labor force, on
the other hand, raises the tradable sector real wage which reduces protability
and accumulation. The e¤ects of an increase in the real exchange rate, by con-
trast, are ambiguous: a real depreciation shifts domestic consumption toward
non-tradables, thus releasing a larger proportion of tradable sector output for
exports, but it may also raise protability and investment (and thus imports).
The evidence suggests that the rst of these e¤ects generally dominates in the
long run: the Marshall-Lerner-Robinson-Bickerdike condition (MLRB condi-
tion) is usually satised, also for LDCs.13 Assuming that this is the case, we
have Fq > 0 and the equilibrium condition (25) denes the real exchange rate
as a function of  and K :
q = 

;
K
L

;  > 0; K  0 (26)
The negative sign of K ts the standard Balassa-Samuelson and Bhagwati-
Kravis-Lipsey results: higher levels of income (higher capital stocks) are associ-
ated with an appreciated real exchange rate.
Viewed from another angle, the above analysis shows that two targets ( IK
and TB) can be achieved using the two instruments  and q. The structure of
the model is such that, given I=K, equation (24) determines q;
q =  

I
K

;  0 > 0 (27)
where the sign of the derivative  0 follows from the assumption that 0 > 0.
The accumulation function (15) can now be used to determine ;
 = 

I
K
; q;
K
L

;  I
K
> 0; q ? 0; K  0 (28)
13See, for example, Bahmani-Oskoee and Niroomand (1998) for a test of the Marshall-Lerner
condition for a large sample of countries. The standard Marshall-Lerner condition focuses
on demand elasticities, assuming a perfectly elastic supply. In our case this supply elasticity
assumption is far from being met: the supply of traded output is constrained by the capital
stock while the world demand elasticity for traded goods is taken to be innite. Note that
the MLRB condition is less stringent than the Marshall-Lerner condition.
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In other words, given the target rate of accumulation, the trade balance condi-
tion determines the real exchange rate while the accumulation target determines
the investment incentive. Equation (27) captures the key result: an increase in
accumulation requires a real depreciation in order to switch domestic expendi-
ture away from tradables and make room for increased capital good imports.
The e¤ects of a depreciation on accumulation are ambiguous. This ambi-
guity may seem surprising, but the intuition is simple: a depreciation raises
the demand for non-tradables and thereby stimulates both employment and the
shared wage ~!N . The result is upward pressure on real wages in the tradable
sector, and depending on the strength of this e¤ect, tradable sector protability
can go either way. Thus, depending on the precise functional form of the wage
equation (6), a real depreciation may raise or lower the rate of accumulation.
If the MLRB condition is satised, however, a rise in q improves the trade-
balance and even if it raises accumulation, an additional growth stimulus from
reductions in the cost of nance (that is, a rise in ) is necessary to avoid an
improvement in the trade balance: a rise in both q and  is needed to bring
about an increase in I=K while keeping TB = 0.
The comparative statics depend on both the MLRB condition and the as-
sumption of substitutability in consumption (0 > 0). If the former is violated,
increased accumulation is associated with a decline in  but the real exchange
rate still depreciates; complementarity in consumption implies that 0 < 0; and
an appreciation is required in order to reduce domestic consumption of tradables
and accommodate a rise in the target accumulation rate.
5.2 Compositional and distributional e¤ects
Changes in real exchange rates inuence the sectoral composition of output.
The share of the non-traded sector in total output can be written
YN
YN + qYT
=
1
1 + qYN YT
The value of YT is determined by the capital stock, YT = bK, and from equation
(20) it follows that
YN
q
=
"
(1  s)
(1  (1  s)) +
( baK; q)
aq
#
bK
(1  )
The sign of the derivative @(YNq )=@q depends on the sensitivity of  to variations
in q and the relative magnitude of the two terms (1 s)(1 (1 s)) and
( baK;q;s)
aq . Thus,
the long-run impact of a real depreciation on the share of the non-traded sector
can be positive. The intuition behind this ambiguity is simple: a real depre-
ciation stimulates employment in the traditional sector, and this expansionary
e¤ect may dominate the negative valuation e¤ect.
The ambiguity of the long-run sectoral e¤ect carries over to the average wage
share (and thus, given the saving assumptions, the average saving rate in the
economy, too). We have
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!NLN + !TLT
YN + qYT
=
!NLN
YN
YN
YN + qYT
+
!TLT
qYT

1  YN
YN + qYT

(29)
Hence, the change in the wage share becomes
d

!NLN + !TLT
YN + qYT

=
YN
YN + qYT
d

!NLN
YN

+

1  YN
YN + qYT

d

!TLT
qYT

+

!NLN
YN
  !TLT
qYT

d

YN
YN + qYT

(30)
By assumption the wage share in the non-tradable sector is constant (!NLN=YN =
) so the rst term on the right hand side of equation (30) is zero. The signs
of the second and third terms, however, are both ambiguous.
Turning to the wage rate, our (strong) assumption about the composition
of workersconsumption implies that a growth policy and the associated real
depreciation raise the consumption real wage in the formal sector as well as the
e¤ective employment and the average remuneration in the traditional sector.
These results, which hold for a given capital stock, are reinforced by the pos-
itive e¤ects of higher accumulation on wages and employment in both sectors.
Fast growth, by construction, is generated by raising the rate of return relative
to the cost of nance in the tradable sector, and it follows that workers and
tradable-sector capitalists have a shared interest in growth. Distributional con-
icts between workers and capitalists may emerge if workers consume tradables
and the wage function  is insensitive to changes in q, but as long as the share
of tradables in workersconsumption remains small, the consumption real wage
would decline much less, proportionately, than the product real wage.
Opposition to a growth policy that involves a real depreciation could come
from landlords. By lowering the real wage in the traditional sector, a depreci-
ation increases rents, but the change in the relative price may reduce the real
value of rents. Depending on the composition of landlord consumption (and
thus the relevant price index), the net e¤ect could go either way.
5.3 The full employment ceiling
The growth policies in this paper are predicated on the existence of unemploy-
ment. Using (18) and (21), the full employment constraint can be written
LN (q;K; s) + LT (K)  L (31)
For a given value of L; this equation denes a maximum, full-employment value
of the real exchange rate
q  qmax = h(K; s); hK < 0; hs > 0 (32)
The presence of large amounts of (hidden) un- and underemployment means
that this condition fails to be binding in most LDCs. Using (26), however, it is
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readily seen that the maximum value of the real exchange rate translates into
a maximum growth rate of the capital stock. As the capital stock increases
(relative to the population) the maximum values of the real exchange rate and
the associated growth rate both decline. Putting it di¤erently, an undervalued
exchange rate and fast capital accumulation ceases to be desirable when the
capital stock is large relative to the size of the total labor force and the pool of
unemployment (and underemployment) dries up. This property of the model
has empirical support: the relation between undervaluation and growth holds
only for developing countries (see Sections 2 and 7).14
5.4 Steady states
Steady growth paths with a positive growth rate do not exist if there are di-
minishing returns to labor in the non-tradable sector and no technical change.
With these assumptions, however, the model has a stationary state if the total
labor supply L is given. In this stationary state we have
I
K
=  (33)
where  is the rate of depreciation and, using equations (27) and (33), the
steady-state value of the real exchange rate is given by
q =  () (34)
Using (28), the investment incentives () now determine the ratio KL and hence
the capital stock, if L is taken as exogenously given. With the capital stock and
the exchange rate xed, equations (20)-(23) can be used to nd non-tradable
employment, output and wages, while outcomes in the tradable sector are given
by (18)-(19). An increase in  pushes up both total output and employment,
but full employment (or ination barriers) clearly sets an upper limit. This
upper limit can be found as in section 5.3, but in the absence of a well-dened,
structural NAIRU, a range of employment outcomes may be feasible.
Analogously, a steady growth path exists if there are constant returns to
labor in the non-tradable sector ( = 1) and the labor force grows at the rate
n: In this case,
I
K
= n+  (35)
14The presence of unemployment may, it could be argued, lead to downward pressure on
money wages, and with a given world market price of traded goods and a given nominal
exchange rate, the result would be a real depreciation. Thus, a fully exible money wage
might take the economy to a full employment position with q = qmax: This mechanism may
not work for a variety of reasons, and stickiness of money wages may be desirable: if the real
exchange rate is determined by the trade balance condition (equation (25)), a decline in money
wages would be associated with changes in the nominal exchange rate, the real exchange rate
would be left unchanged, and standard Keynes/Mundell/Fisher arguments suggest that falling
wages and prices are more likely to be deationary than expansionary if the real exchange
rate is xed. The model leaves out Keynes/Mundell/Fisher e¤ects on accumulation and the
equilibrium solution is homogeneous of degree zero in the nominal wage.
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q =  (n+ ) (36)
and equations (28), (18)-(22) and (5) can be used to solve for capital intensity,
employment rates and real wages.
Steady growth with g 6= n may be of greater interest from the perspective
of LDCs. Growth paths of this kind become possible if  = 1 and changes
in LT =L do not a¤ect the tradable-sector real wage (1 = 0 in equation (6)).
The latter condition may be reasonable when there is a large pool of hidden
unemployment. If g > n, the condition will eventually be violated, but the
economy may show endogenous steady growth for a prolonged period, and the
steady growth rate will be related to the real exchange rate, q =  (g + ).
5.5 Zero sum game?
In this model the pursuit of faster growth through an appropriate combination
of real exchange rates and investment incentives does not imply a zero sum
game: the gains of a fast-growing country are not necessarily o¤set by losses in
other countries. A stylized two country model can be used to demonstrate this.
The home country is described by the model in section 4. We now supple-
ment this with a simple specication of the rest of the world (ROW). We
assume that ROW can produce either investment goods or the tradable con-
sumption good, using the same production process. Thus,
Y K + Y

T = F (L
;K) (37)
This specication of production possibilities implies that pK = pT , assuming
that both types of goods are produced in ROW. Subject to this constraint, the
home country can exchange its tradable good one-for-one for investment goods.
ROW neither gains nor loses from this trade, and the accumulation rate in the
home economy (and the associated real exchange rate) has no impact on ROW.
This result should not be surprising. Growth in our open economy is not
export-led. Our open economy with TB = 0 is isomorphic to a closed economy
in which the modern sector (corresponding to the tradable sector) produces an
output that can be used either for investment or for consumption. With given
investment demand and a given supply of modern sector output, the equilibrium
condition for the modern sector determines the relative price (corresponding to
the real exchange rate), and aggregate employment and output can now be
determined in this closed economy.
Needless to say, it is not our claim that domestic policies never have welfare
e¤ects in other countries. Growth policies, however, need not have negative
externalities for the rest of the world.
6 Short-run dynamics
At least three assumptions need to be relaxed if the model is to be applied to
the short run: export demand is not perfectly elastic, capital in the modern
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sector is not always fully utilized, and net exports are not always zero. With
respect to exports, we assume that the level is predetermined at any moment
but that the growth of exports depends on the international competitiveness of
the domestically produced export good
X^ = F

pT
pT

; F 0 < 0 (38)
where pT is the (foreign currency) price of the foreign goods and a hatover
a variable is used to denote a growth rate (X^ = (dX=dt)=X). The relation
between the terms of trade and the relative price q is given by
pT
pT
=
epT
pN
pN
epT
= q=z (39)
where z = epT =pN : We take z to be a policy variable. The domestic currency
price of the domestically produced tradable good (epT ); on the other hand,
depends on demand conditions. A simple specication along the lines suggested
by Flaschel and Skott (2006) relates changes in the price markup to the rate of
utilization:
e^+ p^T = w^T + (u  u) (40)
where u and u are the actual and desired capital utilization rates in the tradable
sector. We simplify the wage specication for the tradable sector by assuming
that the real wage is constant in terms of non-tradables
!T =
wT
pN
= ! (41)
This assumption implies that w^T = p^N ; and we get the following expression for
the growth rate of q;
q^ = e^+ p^T   p^N = (u  u) (42)
The utilization rate in the tradable sector is determined by
u =
YT
bK
=
X + ET
bK
=
X
bK
+ (1  )(1  s)

u  !LT
qbK
+ (1  ) YN
qbK

=
X
bK
+ (1  )(1  s)u

1  (1  ) +

(1  s)
(1  (1  s)) + (1  )

or
u =
1  (1  s)
s
X
bK
= h(q)
X
K
; h0 < 0 (43)
where 

= epTYT wTLTepTYT = 1  1a !q

is the prot share and the sign of h0 follows
from the assumption of gross substitutability. The prot rate, a key determinant
of accumulation, is given by
r = 
pTYT
pKK
= u
pT
pK
b = u
pT
pK
qb
z
(44)
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Using (43) and (44) the accumulation function (15) can now be written
K^ =
I
K
  
= g(u; q; ; z)  ; gu > 0; gq > 0; g > 0; gz < 0 (45)
and, combining (38) and (45), we have
X^   K^ = F
q
z

  g(u; q; ; z) +  (46)
Given  and z; equations (42) and (46) form a two dimensional system of di¤er-
ential equations in (XK ; q). There is a unique (non-trivial) stationary point and
the Jacobian is given by
J

X
K
; q

=
 guh 1zF 0   guh0XK   gq
h h0XK

The determinant and trace are positive and negative, respectively, and the sta-
tionary point is (locally asymptotically) stable. The utilization rate is equal to
the desired rate at the stationary point, but the stationary solution depends on
the policy variables  and z; and the trade balance need not be zero if  and z
are set independently.
Figure 5 illustrates the dynamics. The q^ = 0 locus is upward sloping while
the ([X=K) = 0 locus can be either negatively or positively sloped; in the latter
case it is steeper than the q^ = 0 locus. An increase in z (a real depreciation)
leaves the q^ = 0 locus unchanged but shifts the ([X=K) = 0 locus upwards. Thus,
starting from an arbitrary point in the phase diagram (i.e. allowing u 6= u) a
real depreciation raises the growth rate of exports and this generates (possibly
with a delay) an increase in the accumulation rate: the new stationary point
has a higher value of q and an unchanged value of u; and from the accumulation
function it therefore follows that the system converges to a stationary point with
a higher accumulation rate. The utilization rate initially falls but then increases
again as it moves toward the (unchanged) desired rate.
An increase in  also raises the accumulation rate. The ([X=K) = 0 locus
shifts down and the new solution involves a lower export-capital ratio. Thus,
a depreciation and an increase in the investment incentive have similar e¤ects
on the accumulation rate, but the implications for the trade balance are quite
di¤erent. We have
TB
K
= pT
X
K
  pK(K^ + ) (47)
At a stationary point X^ = K^ = g and pT = pT (g). Hence,
TB
K
= pT (g)
X
K
  pK(g + ) (48)
An increase in g reduces the trade balance, and if the stimulus comes from an
increase in , this e¤ect is reinforced by a decline in the export-capital ratio. If
the stimulus comes from a real depreciation, however, the deterioration may be
o¤set by an increase in the export-capital ratio.
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7 Empirics
7.1 Deriving the index of real exchange rate misalignment
We follow the three-step methodology pursued by Rodrik (2008) to obtain an
index of real exchange rate undervaluation. Using data from Penn World Tables
6.2 (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2006), we rst calculate the real exchange
rate (RER) as the ratio between the nominal exchange rate (XRAT ) and the
purchasing power parity conversion factor (PPP ). We use a 5-year frequency,
in which each observation corresponds to the period average. Both variables are
expressed as national currency units per U.S. dollar. However, since PPP is
calculated over the entire GDP, the basket includes non-tradables for which we
do not expect the law of one price to hold. Thus, in order to calculate equilibrium
real exchange rates, in a second step we adjust for the Balassa-Samuelson (BS)
e¤ect, regressing RER on real GDP per capita (RGDPCH):
lnRERit = +  lnRGDPCHit + ft + "it (49)
where i and t are country and time indexes, respectively, ft accounts for time
xed e¤ects, and "it is the error term. Similarly to Rodrik, we obtain an estimate
of b =  0:24, with a t-statistic of 21.29. The sign of the coe¢ cient is in line with
the Balassa-Samuelson prediction; in this case, a 10% increase in RGDPCH is
associated with a 2.4% real appreciation. Finally, we dene the undervalua-
tion index (UNDERV AL) as the ratio of actual to BS-adjusted real exchange
rates: UNDERV ALit = RERit=\RERit. Dened this way, UNDERV AL is
comparable across countries and over time; when it exceeds unity, the domestic
currency is undervalued in real terms (i.e. domestic goods are cheap in interna-
tional dollar terms). We use lnUNDERV AL as the main variable of interest;
it has a zero mean and a standard deviation of 0.47.15
7.2 Growth Regressions
This section replicates and evaluates key results of Rodrik (2008). Following
Rodrik, we conducted a series of panel data regressions for a data set of a
maximum of 184 countries and up to eleven 5-year time periods spanning 1950-
2004.16 The xed e¤ects model can be written as follows:
GROWTHit = + lnRGDPCHit 1+ lnUNDERV ALit+ft+fi+Xit+"it
(50)
The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per
capita, RGDPCHit 1captures the convergence term, ft time specic e¤ects,
fi country specic e¤ects, "it is the error term, and X is a vector of standard
control variables, which includes government consumption, the ination rate,
15Rodrik reports that lnUNDERV AL has a zero mean and standard deviation of 0.48.
16Following Rodrik, for the growth regressions we exclude from the sample three countries
with extreme values of lnUNDERV AL: Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Korea and Laos.
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gross domestic savings,17 degree of openness, human capital (years of education),
terms of trade, foreign debt, real exchange rate volatility, and an index of rule of
law.18 Table 1 lists the variable denitions and data sources. The specication
in (50) estimates the e¤ect of changes in undervaluation on changes in the rate
of growth "within" countries.
In the baseline regression (Table 2, column 1), the estimated coe¢ cient of
lnUNDERV AL is b = 0:015 which is signicant at 1%. This implies that a
one standard deviation (0.47) in lnUNDERV AL boosts the rate of growth by
almost 0.75 percent points per annum. The coe¢ cient, however, turns smaller
and less signicant as the number of control variables is increased, and when
the terms of trade is added to the control group, lnUNDERV AL becomes
insignicant. The regression in column 6 controls for the rule of law index,
for which data are available for only two periods, 1995-99 and 2000-04. The
estimated coe¢ cient is larger (b = 0:024) and signicant at 5%.
Classifying developing (developed) countries as those with a real GDP per
capita of less (more) than $6,000, Rodrik (2008) argues that the e¤ect of UNDERV AL
on economic growth is larger and signicant for developing countries. He nds
that the estimated coe¢ cient of lnUNDERV AL in the baseline regression is
low and not signicant for developed countries, whereas it is large and signicant
for developing countries. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 3 reproduce those results.
Table 3 also shows that the asymmetric e¤ect of undervaluation between coun-
tries is very sensitive to the choice of the GDP per capita that divides the sample
between developed and developing countries. For instance, if the cut-o¤ is se-
lected from anywhere in the $9,000-$15,000 range, the estimated coe¢ cient is
large (between 0.016 and 0.031) and signicant for developed countries too.19
Thus, Rodriks claim regarding the asymmetric e¤ect of undervaluation between
developed and developing countries critically depends on the choice of the GDP
per capita cut-o¤. Columns (1) to (3) also show that for the group of low-income
countries (less than $6,000) the e¤ect of undervaluation tends to increase as in-
come per capita decreases. Overall, the evidence in Table 3 suggests not only
that the e¤ect of undervaluation on growth depends on income level but also
that the relationship is non-monotonic: it appears to operate for very low and
middle-income countries.
Given how sensitive the result is to the choice of the GDP per capita cut-
o¤, we next explored whether the asymmetric e¤ect of undervaluation between
17Since both our model and casual empiricism suggest that the saving rate is a¤ected by
the real exchange rate, UNDERV AL and the saving rate (GDSGDP ) are likely to be highly
collinear. To correct for multicollinearity, we estimated the e¤ect of undevaluation on the sav-
ing rate (GDSGDP = + lnUNDERV ALit+ft+fi+"it) and then used the residuals of this
regression as a control variable. With this methodology the coe¢ cient on lnUNDERV AL
captures its direct e¤ect on the dependent variable (GROWTH) and its indirect e¤ect through
the saving rate. The coe¢ cient on the residuals captures the e¤ect of the saving rate on the
dependent variable, net of the e¤ect of lnUNDERV AL.
18We also explored lagged e¤ects of lnunderval but found these to be insignicant in the
baseline regression.
19For countries with GDP per capita less than a cuto¤ in the range of $6,000-$16,000, the
estimated coe¢ cient is between 0.024 and 0. 017 and always signicant at 1%. An appendix
with details is available on request.
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developing and developed countries persists when we use alternative classica-
tions. First, we used a relatively standard classication in dening developed
countries as a group of 23 countries typically considered industrialized.20 We
refer to this as classication I.One potential objection to this classication is
its static nature: countries are classied as either developed or developing based
on their current status. In our sample period that covers 55 years, it is not
evident that a country that is now seen as developed would have been consid-
ered the same at the beginning of the sample. Some European countries in the
immediate post-war period come to mind in this regard. Similarly, there might
be developing countries today which could have been considered developed at
the beginning of the sample. An example is Argentina. In order to provide a
more dynamic classication of countries, our second classication, termed clas-
sication II,denes developed countries as those which in a given 5-year period
were at a per capita GDP level at least half that of the US, excluding those that
had a population of less than a million in 2004. Under this classication, some
countries are dened as developed (developing) at the beginning but not at the
end of the sample.21
Tables 4 and 5 present estimates of equation (50) for developing and de-
veloped countries, respectively, according to Classication I. The e¤ect of un-
dervaluation on growth in developing countries appears to be large and highly
signicant. The estimates are robust to the use of di¤erent control variables.
The estimated coe¢ cient reported in columns 1 to 5 remains stable in the range
between 0.017 and 0.026 and is always signicant at 1%, except for the regres-
sion that includes the rule of law index, where it is signicant at 5%.22 The
e¤ect of undervaluation is also robust to changes in the sample period. The
coe¢ cient is signicant for both periods (1950-79 and 1980-2004, respectively),
although it varies from 0.031 to 0.013.
The results for developed countries are not as conclusive as those for de-
veloping countries. This may partly result from the smaller sample size. In
the baseline regression in Table 5, lnUNDERV AL is signicant at 1% and the
coe¢ cient is very similar to that estimated for developing countries. Given the
relatively smaller sample size, we introduced control variables one at a time.
In the regressions reported in columns 2 to 6, lnUNDERV AL appears to be
signicant mostly at 5% and its estimated coe¢ cient remains stable in the 0.014-
0.017 range. These results would suggest that for developed countries the e¤ect
of undervaluation on growth is large (although smaller on average than in de-
veloping countries) and statistically signicant. The regressions reported in the
20The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zeland, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switerland, United Kindom and United States. Other studies have
followed a similar classication. See, for example, (Prasad et al., 2007a).
21According to classication I, there are (1123 =) 253 observations for developed countries.
The number changes to 226 under classication II. Of these, 196 are common. The lists
of developed countries according to these criteria are presented in the available-on-request
appendix.
22Recall that rule of law index data is available for only two time periods, 1995-99 and
2000-04 and therefore there is little time variation.
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columns 7 to 10 are however not supportive of such a judgement. When using
terms of trade (column 7) and the rule of law index (column 8) as controls,
lnUNDERV AL is not signicant. When we control for changes in the terms of
trade, the estimated coe¢ cient actually turns negative. Finally, once we divide
the sample into two periods, lnUNDERV AL is signicant (at 5%) only for the
period 1980-2004.
Using classication II generates qualitatively similar results to those for clas-
sication I for both developed and developing countries. The noteworthy di¤er-
ences are that for developed countries under classication II lnUNDERV AL
appears not to be signicant in the regressions in which the sample is divided
into two sub-periods and its coe¢ cient turns negative when the regression in-
cludes rule of law as a control. These results are provided in the unpublished
appendix.
The results based on our two classication criteria do not provide partic-
ularly strong support for Rodriks claim that the e¤ect of undervaluation on
growth is especially important for developing countries. Although the results
are more robust for these countries, there is still evidence that undervaluation
a¤ects growth positively in developed countries. An alternative strategy to eval-
uate his claim is to investigate whether the e¤ect of undervaluation on growth
varies with countriesincome levels. Table 2 suggested that this could be the
case. Rodrik (2008) makes lnUNDERV AL interact with real GDP per capita
(RGDPCH) and nds that the e¤ect of undervaluation decreases monotoni-
cally with income level. Column 7 in Table 2 replicates Rodriks nding.23 Our
estimated coe¢ cients are almost identical to those obtained by Rodrik. Accord-
ing to these, the e¤ect of lnUNDERV AL turns negative at levels of GDP per
capita above $17,549. Columns 8 and 9 in Table 2 report results from regressions
in which we add quadratic and cubic interaction terms. Figure 6 illustrates the
e¤ect of undervaluation on growth at di¤erent levels of GDP per capita for the
linear, quadratic, and cubic forms (columns 7-9).
In both the linear and the cubic forms, the e¤ect of undervaluation on growth
tends to decrease with the income level. The cubic form performs best statis-
tically among the three (both in terms of adjusted R2 and t-statistics). This
form was anticipated by the results in Table 2, where we found that the e¤ect
of undervaluation was the largest for the poorest countries, but also appeared
to be signicant for middle income countries. It is not easy, however, to nd
a convincing explanation for why the e¤ect of undervaluation decreases non-
monotonically with income level. Figure 6 initially led us to think that the
estimated decreasing part of the cubic form in the low-income range was due
either to outliers or to data of dubious quality infectingthe results. We ac-
tually found that once the sample is truncated at a level of GDP per capita
greater than $3,000, the best t is a quadratic form describing an inverted U
curve. Such a shape would be easier to interpret. Undervaluation may not favor
growth in very poor countries because relatively small increases in protability
23 Instead of using the lag of the undervaluation index (lnRGDPCHt 1) as Rodrik does,
we use the current level (lnRGDPCHt).
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in the tradable sector may not adequately compensate for entrenched structural
factors characterizing underdevelopment (e.g. lack of infrastructure and rule of
law, supply constraints, low stock of human and physical capital, etc.), and in
richer countries because the tradable sector is already mature. However, the ob-
servations below $3,000 account for almost 40% of the sample, and data quality
may not justify the exclusion of all low income countries: when we controlled
for data quality by excluding countries with grade D(i.e. the lowest quality
according to the grading scheme in the Penn World Tables), the cubic form
remained the best t.
In conclusion, the e¤ect of currency undervaluation on growth appears to
be larger and more robust for developing countries. This results derives mainly
from interacting lnUNDERV AL with real GDP per capita. The latter indi-
cates that the e¤ect of currency undervaluation tends to decrease with the level
of GDP per capita. However, the decrease is not monotonic as Rodrik suggests.
Consistent with his results, the e¤ect of undervaluation on growth seems to
be the largest for very poor countries, but it is also sizable for middle-income
countries. More research is needed to identify the factors driving this result.
7.3 Investment growth regressions
7.3.1 Empirical model
Our theoretical model predicts a positive relationship between the degree of
exchange rate undervaluation and the rate of capital accumulation. Lacking
reliable and consistent panel data for the capital stock, however, we rewrite the
accumulation equation to get an expression for the average rate of growth of
investment (GROWTHGFCF ). Using equation (45), we have
I
K
= g(u; q; ; z)
or
ln I = lnK + ln g(u; q; ; z) (51)
The values of u and q converge to stationary points determined by (; z). With
very fast convergence, the average values of u and q over a discrete period will
be determined largely by the contemporary values of (; z); more generally, both
contemporary and lagged values of (; z) will a¤ect u and q. Thus, equation
(51) suggests the following discrete-time version of the investment equation
ln I = lnK + lnH(;  1; ::: n; z; z 1; :::; z n) (52)
Taking rst di¤erences, this investment equation implies that
 ln I =  lnK + lnH(;  1; ::: n; z; z 1; :::; z n)
=
I 1
K 1
+ lnH(;  1; ::: n; z; z 1; :::; z n)
= G(;  1; ::: n;  (n+1); z; z 1; :::; z n; z (n+1)) (53)
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We use the degree of undervaluation as an indicator of the z variable and include
a range of variables to control for the general investment/growth environment
(corresponding here to the current and lagged values of ). Thus, using a linear
approximation and setting n = 1, we estimate equations of the form
GROWTHGFCFit = + 0 lnRGDPCHit 1 + 0 lnUNDERV ALit
+1 lnUNDERV ALit 1 + 2 lnUNDERV ALit 2
+Xt + ft + fi + "it (54)
The long-run e¤ect of a persistent increase in undervaluation (the sum of the
 coe¢ cients) is expected to be positive, but the existence of lags implies that
the individual  coe¢ cients cannot be signed unambiguously by the model.24
7.3.2 Econometric estimates
The average annual rate of investment growth (GROWTHGFCF ) is calculated
from the gross xed capital formation (GFCF) series obtained from the World
Banks World Development Indicators. The available sample period is 1960-
2004 and we continue to use 5-year observations for the 184 countries. In all
the regressions we exclude extreme values of the undervaluation index from the
sample ( 1:5 > lnUNDERV AL > 1:5).25 Ideally, one would want to include
lags of the controls. Since many of the controls are only available for shorter
periods, however, there would be a high cost in terms of degrees of freedom.
Table 6 reports results from the estimation of equation (54) for the whole
sample with di¤erent combinations of control variables. The table reports the
individual estimates of coe¢ cients on lnUNDERV AL (i) and also its long-run
e¤ect, along with the associated Wald statistic for the test of joint signicanceP2
i=0 ^i = 0. In columns 1 to 5, the coe¢ cient on lnUNDERV ALt 1 is sig-
nicant at 1% and stable in the range 0.042-0.051. This would suggest that
24The rst-order approximation of (53) at a stationary point (; z; _; _z) = (; z; 0; 0)
can be written
 ln I = +
nX
i=0
H i (
; z) (i+1) +
nX
i=0
Hzi (
; z)z (i+1)
+
nX
i=0
H i
H
( i    (i+1)) +
nX
i=0
Hz i
H
(z i   z (i+1)
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H
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n 1X
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+
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 (i+1)  H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+
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With 5-year periods, each estimated coe¢ cient may be a weighted average of some of the
coe¢ cients in the above equation and cannot be unambiguously signed. The long-run e¤ect
of a persistent change in undervaluation, however, is given by
P
Hz i > 0:
25This involves excluding a maximum of 15 data points.
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some time is needed for a competitive currency to stimulate investment deci-
sions. The current e¤ect of lnUNDERV AL is slightly negative (between -0.002
and -0.017) and insignicant, whereas the twice lagged coe¢ cient is negative,
varies between -0.015 and -0.027 and is signicant at either 5% or 10%, ex-
cept for the baseline equation where it is not signicant. When we consider
the overall long-run e¤ect of undervaluation on investment growth, we observe
that it tends to be small and statistically insignicant, except for the baseline
equation in which it is moderately large (0.023) and the Wald test indicates
signicance at 10%. In the regressions that include the terms of trade and
the rule of law index (columns 6 and 7, respectively) lnUNDERV AL and its
lags are not signicant either individually or jointly. Column 8 reports the re-
gression in which lnUNDERV AL interacts with the level of GDP per capita.
The negative sign on the interaction term indicates that as income per capita
increases the e¤ect of lnUNDERV AL decreases. According to the estimated
coe¢ cients, the long-run e¤ect of undervaluation becomes nil at a level of GDP
per capita around $8,800. Thus, the positive e¤ect of currency undervaluation
on investment growth appears to operate particularly for developing countries.26
Tables 7 and 8 provide further evidence that the e¤ect of undervaluation on
investment growth is particularly important for developing countries (as dened
under Classication I). Table 7 reports the xed e¤ect regressions for developing
countries. The long-run e¤ect of undervaluation is large, signicant and robust
to various controls. In columns 1 to 6, the estimated long-run coe¢ cient is in
the range of 0.056-0.066. The only case where the coe¢ cient is smaller and not
signicant is the regression that includes the rule of law index (column 7). Note,
however, that undervaluation is not the only variable that loses explanatory
power. Most of the control variables that in the previous specications are
highly signicant turn insignicant here. This result seems attributable to the
small number of observations available for the rule of law index.
Table 7 shows that the positive e¤ect of undervaluation on investment growth
in developing countries also appears to operate mainly through the rst lag. The
estimated coe¢ cient for 1 is always large and signicant (except for that in col-
umn 7). On the other hand, the current e¤ect of lnUNDERV AL is larger and
in some instances signicant (columns 3 and 5). The e¤ect of the second lag
is insignicant. Finally, the positive long-run e¤ect of currency undervaluation
on investment growth for developing countries is robust to changes in the sam-
ple period (columns 8 and 9). When we split the sample into two sub-periods
(1960-1984 and 1985-2004), the long-run coe¢ cient of lnUNDERV AL is sig-
nicant at 5% in both periods. Figure 7, which plots the partial residual plot
associated with column 1 of Table 7 suggests a positive relationship between
lagged LNUNDERV AL and investment growth.
Table 8 shows the results for developed countries. Because of the small
number of observations, we introduce control variables individually. The long-
run e¤ect of undervaluation is statistically indistinguishable from zero in all
26We also tried non-linear specications but found the quadratic interaction term to be
insignicant.
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the regressions. The estimated coe¢ cient on lnUNDERV ALt 1 is large and
positive (although not very signicant) but is neutralized by the negative
e¤ects of the current level and second lag. The results using Classication II,
reported in the available-on-request appendix, are qualitatively similar to those
in Tables 7 and 8.
Tables 9 and 10 report robustness checks of the positive relationship be-
tween currency undervaluation and investment growth found for developing
countries. Since the real exchange rate is arguably determined jointly with
other variables, a potential concern is that the results provided in Table 7 are
contaminated by endogeneity/simultaneity problems. To address potential si-
multaneity/endogeneity problems, we carry out dynamic panel estimations using
the Arellano-Bond two-step General Method of Moments (GMM) method. We
treat lnUNDERV AL as endogenous and use its lagged values as instruments.27
Table 9 reports the main results. The long-run coe¢ cient on lnUNDERV AL
(row (e)) is signicant at 1% for developing countries using both Classications
I and II. It is reassuring to see that the values of the estimates with GMM
are relatively similar to those of the baseline xed e¤ect OLS estimation.28 As
in the OLS estimations, the individual coe¢ cient on the rst lag is large and
signicant, and the coe¢ cient on the current value is positive but generally
insignicant. The estimated values for the individual coe¢ cients are also simi-
lar.29 For developed countries, the long-run coe¢ cient is not signicant under
either classication. For the whole sample, the estimated long-run coe¢ cient on
lnUNDERV AL is signicant at 1%, but lower than that for developing coun-
tries. Overall, the results of the GMM estimations support the earlier ndings.
Table 10 reports robustness checks for outliers and asymmetries. Columns
2 and 3 present the results of the baseline regression applied to successively
narrower ranges of lnUNDERV AL for developing countries. The long-run co-
e¢ cient is always positive and signicant. The estimated e¤ect ranges from
0.061 and 0.066. As in the previous analyses, the e¤ect of undervaluation on
investment growth operates mainly through the rst lag. Columns 4 and 5,
reports the estimated coe¢ cients for the baseline equation applied separately to
developing countries with undervalued (lnUNDERV AL > 0) and overvalued
(lnUNDERV AL < 0) exchange rates, respectively. The long-run e¤ect of un-
dervaluation is marginally insignicant for countries with undervalued exchange
rates and only signicant at 10% for countries with overvalued exchange rates.
The evidence reported in this subsection suggests that real undervaluations
have a positive e¤ect on investment growth mainly for developing countries.
This conclusion results from two sources. First, we found that lnUNDERV AL
27Given that in the regressions reported in Table 7, the second lag of lnUNDERV AL was
systematically insignicant and very close to zero, we omit it from the GMM analysis. Also,
since from a general equilibrium perspective lnRGDPCHt 1 and lnUNDERV ALt 1 are
endogenous variables, we treated both as endogenous regressors in the GMM regressions.
28The GMM and OLS estimates (Table 6) for the baseline specication are b0+ b1 = 0:079
and 0:060;respectively.
29We get b0 = 0:012 and b1 = 0:048 in the OLS estimation, and b0 = 0:021 and b1 = 0:042
in the GMM estimation.
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interacts negatively with the level of real GDP per capita, indicating that its ef-
fect on investment growth decreases with countriesincome level. Second, using
our two classications of developed and developing countries, we found that the
e¤ect of undervaluation on investment growth is large and signicant only for
developing countries. The small sample size for developed countries somewhat
limits the condence with which we can assess the results, but additional support
comes from the fact that the long-run e¤ect of lnUNDERV AL is insignicant
for the whole sample (Table 6), but signicant for developing countries (Table
7). Overall, the evidence of a distinction between e¤ects on developing versus
developed countries seems more conclusive for investment growth than for GDP
growth. These ndings appear to be robust to econometric methodology and
di¤erent degrees of exchange rate misalignment.
8 Conclusions
The theoretical part of this paper analyzed an economy with signicant amounts
of open and/or hidden unemployment. In this economy, non-tradable output
and employment are demand-led; output is not constrained by the supply of
labor, and an investment stimulus can a¤ect both the level of output and the
growth rate. Put di¤erently, growth in our model is not export-led in the sense
of net exports acting as a necessary driver of demand. Instead, there is a close
a¢ nity with the argument presented by Rodrik (1997) who saw investment pro-
motion rather than exports as key to growth in Taiwan and Korea. Investment
promotion, however, has implications for the balance of payments and requires
a suitable real exchange rate policy in order to be sustainable. Thus, the real
exchange rate becomes a critical element of successful development, and in this
sense there is a link between our argument and the BPCG literature.
The empirical part tested one of the main implications of our model: the ex-
istence of a positive relationship between real exchange rate undervaluation on
the one hand, and output and investment growth on the other. If, as suggested
by the model, the presence of under-employment constitutes an important chan-
nel through which the real exchange rate a¤ects the economy, the real exchange
rate may be more e¤ective in promoting accumulation and employment in low
income developing countries compared to developed countries. Our econometric
results, which are robust to a variety of classications, controls, sample periods,
and estimation techniques provide support to this prediction, especially in the
case of investment growth. Following Rodrik (2008), undervaluations are also
found to boost output growth, although the di¤erence between developing and
developed countries appears to be less robust in this case.
Capital market liberalization may a¤ect a countrys capacity to implement
its growth and trade targets by compromising its ability to set both the interest
rate and the exchange rate independently of foreign interest rates. The problem
may not be severe: in a exible exchange rate regime, a decrease in the interest
rate will both stimulate investment and alleviate the associated pressure on the
trade balance by causing a depreciation. There is likely to be some net e¤ect on
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the trade balance but, in principle, an interest rate policy that aims to achieve a
desired real exchange rate can be supplemented by a combination of taxes and
subsidies to provide the required investment incentives. In practice, however,
this type of policy may fall foul of WTO regulations and/or involve signicant
subsidy costs. Partly because of these problems, the implementation of growth
policies with balanced trade will typically demand a more sophisticated admin-
istrative capability under conditions of free capital mobility. Thus, it may be
no accident that the prominent examples of fast growth with an undervalued
exchange rate come from countries (and periods) with signicant restrictions on
capital mobility.30 We leave these questions for future research.
Even taking for granted the ability of policy makers to inuence the real
exchange rate, our analysis clearly is highly stylized and has many limitations.
As suggested in section 5 and the appendix, however, some of the simplify-
ing assumptions of the benchmark model can be relaxed without a¤ecting the
qualitative results.
It has been argued, nally, that exchange rate overvaluations are associated
with output volatility.31 Output volatility, which may be the result of balance-
of-payments induced stop-go policies, may in turn lead to social conict, and
some have attributed the negative correlation between overvaluation and growth
to the e¤ects of macroeconomic instability and social conict.32 33 This poten-
tially important channel plays no role in the model. However, to the extent
that workers mainly consume non-tradables, our model suggests that a real de-
preciation may avoid the instability and distributional conicts that could arise
if policy makers attempt to raise prots instead through direct wage suppression
in the tradable sector.
A Extension: respecifying workersconsumption
As a more general specication, one could allow for saving out of wage income,
with saving propensities that depend on both sector and income category, and
let the composition of consumption depend on the source of income. Thus, let
sw and sr represent the saving rates out of wages and rents in the non-tradable
sector and w and p the corresponding rates for the tradable sector, and let p
and w be the shares of non-tradables in the consumption out of prots/rents
and wages. The equilibrium condition for the non-tradable can now be written
YN = w(1 sw)YN+w(1 w)WT+p(1 sr)(1 )YN+p(1 p)(qYT WT )
30See, for example, Ma and McCauley (2008) and Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian
(2007a,b).
31See, for example, Johnson et al. (2007).
32See, for example, Fischer (1993).
33See, for empirical evidence, Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Berg et al. (2008)
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where WT = ( bKa ; q; sw; sr; w; p)
bK
a is the wage bill in the tradable sector.
Solving for YN and substituting into the expression for ET ; we get
ET = AYT +
B
q
WT
where
A = (1  p)  p(1  p) sw + sr(1  )
1  w(1  sw)   p(1  sr)(1  )
B = (p   w)  [(1  w)w   (1  p)p] sw + sr(1  )
1  w(1  sw)   p(1  sr)(1  )
The value of A is decreasing in q as long as the substitutability condition
is satised for both p and w (0p(q) > 0; w(q) > 0). Hence, the condition
@

B
qWT

=@q  0 is su¢ cient to ensure that the domestic demand for trad-
ables will be inversely related to the real exchange rate. Our specication in
section 4 emerges as a special case with w = 1; sw = w = 0; sr = p = s > 0.
Another simple case arises with uniform saving rates and consumption compo-
sitions (w = p and sw = w = sr = p = s > 0). Both of these cases satisfy
the above stated condition since, in both cases, B  0.
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Figure 1: Measure of tradability of sectoral output in China. 1= mining, 2 =
chemicals, 3 = machinery & equipment, 4 = petroleum products, 5 = nancial
services, 6 = Metal products, 7 = agriculture, 8 = construction, 9 = production
& supply of electricity, 10 = real estate, 11 = other services, 12 = food, 13 =
building materials, 14 = transportation & telecom., 15 = other manufacturing,
16 = wholesale and retail trades, and 17 = textile, apparel, & footwear. Source:
National Bureau of Statistics (2008, Table 3-24) and authorscalculations.
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Figure 2: Time plots of undervaluation (right hand scale), output growth, and
accumulation rate for China (1952-2004). Source: PWT 6.2, Wang and Szirmai
(2008), and authorscalculations.
Figure 3: Scatter plot of undervaluation versus accumulation for China (1952-
2004). Sources: PWT 6.2, Wang and Szirmai (2008), and authorscalculations..
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Figure 4: Scatter plot of undervaluation versus the trade balance (as a propor-
tion of GDP) for China (1970-2004). Source: WDI
Figure 5: Phase diagram for the short-run set-up
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Figure 6: Linear, quadratic, and cubic interactions of GDP per capita growth
with lnunderval
Figure 7: Partial residual plot of investment growth versus lagged undervalua-
tion for developing countries
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